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When James Madison wrote THE FEDERALIST
No. 10, he expressed strong discontent with polit-
ical parties.' Madison often referred to political
parties as factions. He recognized that if a politi-
cal party with sinister views consisted of less than a
majority, relief would be supplied by the republi-
can principle that enables the majority to defeat
such a view by regular vote.2 In 1996, California
voters shared Madison's view when they enacted
Proposition 198.3 Proposition 198 changed Cali-
fornia's partisan primary election from a closed
primary to a blanket primary. In a closed primary
system, a voter must identify with a political party
affiliation when registering to vote and can vote
only for candidates of that party.4 Under Califor-
nia's new blanket primary system, "all persons en-
titled to vote, including those not affiliated with
any political party shall have the right to vote...
for any candidate regardless of the candidate's po-
litical affiliation."5
Under Proposition 198, the candidate of each
party who wins the most votes is that party's nomi-
nee for the general election. 6 After California vot-
ers passed Proposition 198, several of California's
political parties brought suit alleging that Proposi-
I THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (Alexander Hamilton).
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most consid-
erate and virtuous citizens that . . . the public good is
disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties and that mea-
sures are too often decided, not according to the rules
of justice and the rights of a minor party, but by the su-
perior force of an interesting and overbearing majority.
Id.
2 Id.
3 Initiative Measure Proposition 198 (approved Mar. 26,
1996) (codified at CAL ELEC. CODE §§ 2001, 2151 (1996)).
4 Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1289
(E.D. Cal. 1997).
5 CAL ELEC. CODE § 2001.
tion 198 was contrary to their First Amendment
rights because it:
permits voters who are not members of a particular
party, who may indeed be hostile to that party's electo-
ral interests to vote in that party's primary and thus to
participate in the process by which the party defines its
positions on a variety of issues and by which it chooses
its [standard-bearers].'
The Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of California, in California Democratic Party v.
Jones," reviewed Proposition 198 and found that it
was within the rights embodied in the Constitu-
tion.9 When the Supreme Court reviewed Proposi-
tion 198, it reversed the lower court's holding,
and held that California's use of a blanket pri-
mary to determine a political party's nominee for
the general election placed a "severe and unnec-
essary burden" on petitioner's rights of political
association and therefore violated the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.'
Supporters of Proposition 198 argued "that the
closed primary favors the election of party hard-
liners, contributes to legislative gridlock, and
stacks the deck against more modern problem
solvers."" In addition, California voters adopted
Proposition 198 by a "convincing margin of those
6 Jones, 984 F. Supp. at 1289 (citing a legislative analysis
explaining the blanket primary instituted by Proposition
198).
7 Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 169 F.3d. 646, 653 (9th
Cir. 1999).
8 984 F. Supp. 1288.
* Jones, 984 F. Supp. at 1289.
10 Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402, 2414
(2000). The text of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution provides in part, "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech or the right of the
people ... to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
11 Jones, 169 F.3d at 649.
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voting, [59.51% to 40.49%]."12 While the Su-
preme Court traditionally recognizes that the
freedom of association protected by the First
Amendment includes partisan political organiza-
tion,'" it should not ignore the message of the
California voting electorate's First Amendment
freedom to initiate change. 14
This note analyzes the Supreme Court's ban on
California's blanket primary law and its effect on
the initiative process. Part I of this note outlines
the general development of the freedom of associ-
ation. Part II recounts the facts and holding of
Jones. Part III discusses the development of the Su-
preme Court's precedent regarding the freedom
of association in the context of election law chal-
lenges. Part IV applies this precedent to argue
that Jones was wrongly decided, and Proposition
198 was indeed constitutional. Finally, Part V con-
cludes that citizens have a First Amendment free-
dom when they seek change at the ballot box, and
this right should not be restricted through arbi-
trary judicial activism.
I. DEFINING THE FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION
To understand fully the constitutional issues
presented by Jones and Proposition 198, it is neces-
sary to review the freedom of association. The
First Amendment does not explicitly provide a
freedom of association. However, in numerous
cases, the Supreme Court has held that freedom
to associate derives by implication from the ex-
plicit rights of speech, press, assembly and peti-
tion. 15 The Court does not broadly construe the
freedom of association. What the Court has recog-
nized in the context of a freedom of association is
a right to join with others to pursue ends having
special First Amendment freedom. 16 Laurence
12 Id.
13 See, e.g., Elrod v. Burnes, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976); Tashjian v. Republi-
can Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing in part that "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech
or the right of the people ... to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances").
15 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIrUTIONAL LAw 1012
(Foundation Press 2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE] (citing
Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkley, 454 U.S. 290
(1981)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
16 TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1015.
17 Id.
18 Id; see, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and
Tribe argues that Supreme Court case law sug-
gests that government can abridge this implied
freedom of association in four ways. 17 These
abridgments are: (1) directly punishing the mere
fact of membership in a group or association;
(2) compelling unnecessary disclosure of a
group's membership list or of an individual's asso-
ciational affiliations through a focused investiga-
tion or a general disclosure rule; (3) withholding
a privilege or benefit from the members of a
group or association; and (4) intruding on an or-
ganization's right to exclude or not associate with
those whom it does not wish to be members.' 8
One other way the government might intrude on
the constitutional freedom of association is to in-
terfere with an organization's internal structure.' 9
For example impermissible interference on an or-
ganization's internal structure might include at-
tempts to control a political party's delegate seat-
ing procedures at political convention. 20
A. "Guilt by Association" Is Usually
Unconstitutional
The government infringes on the freedom of
association when it arbitrarily outlaws an associa-
tion or punishes individuals associated with it.21
In these cases constitutional review is twofold.22
First, an association or organization cannot be
made illegal in the absence of a clear showing that
the group is actively engaged in prohibited con-
duct.23 Second, an individual cannot be punished
for joining, associating with, or attending meet-
ings of an association or organization unless the
association meets the first requirement.24 The in-
dividual, by engaging in prohibited conduct with
an association, must be shown to have affiliated
(a) with knowledge of its illegality and (b) with
the specific intent of furthering its illegal aims by
Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995) (holding
that the right to not associate allows private parties who con-
duct a parade to exclude unwanted members).
19 TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1015.
20 Id. at 1014 n.24 (citing Democratic Party of United
States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 n.22
(1981) (holding that a state cannot compel a national party
to seat a delegation chosen contrary to party rules)).
21 Id. at 1015.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1015 n.27 (citing Noto v. United States, 367 U.S.
290, 297-98 (1961) (reversing conviction for membership in
the Communist Party because the evidence did not suffice to
establish that the party had engaged in unlawful behavior)).
24 Id.
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such individual affiliation.2 5
B. Compulsory Disclosure of Membership Lists
May Violate the Freedom of Association
The government can also violate the freedom
of association if, without a compelling interest, it
inquires into the membership of an organiza-
tion. 26 Additionally, the government infringes on
the freedom of association when it inquires about
what specific organizations an individual has
joined without a compelling reason to inquire.27
For instance, the Supreme Court has recognized
that "compelled disclosure may constitute a re-
straint on freedom of association." 28 The Su-
preme Court in Brown v. Socialist Workers Party29
went further to discourage compelled disclosure
of membership lists by holding a statute unconsti-
tutional that applied specifically to force disclo-
sure of membership lists belonging to the Social-
ist Worker's Party. The statute challenged in
Brown required disclosure of campaign contribu-
tors and recipients of campaign disbursements.
This statute would have been constitutional if it
were applied in a more neutral manner and to all
political parties.3 0
C. Government Abridges the Freedom of
Association if It Withholds Benefits or
Privileges From Individuals Because They
Are a Member of a Group or Association
A third situation where the government might
25 Id. at 1015 n.28 (citing Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S.
11 (1966)).
26 Id. at 1019.
27 Id.
28 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463
(1958) (reversing civil contempt judgment against NAACP
for refusing to disclose its membership list).
29 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
30 TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1019 n.61 (citing Brown v. So-
cialist Workers, 459 U.S. 87, 95 (1982)).
31 Id. at 1017.
32 Id. at 1017 n.44 (citing Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs,
353 U.S. 232 (1957)).
33 Id. at 1017 n.45 (citing Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17
(1968) (construing a federal statute narrowly so that Con-
gress could not delegate executive officials the authority to
condition employment on American merchant vessels upon
nonmembership in the Communist Party)).
34 Id. at 1017 n.47 (citing Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378
U.S. 500 (1964)).
35 Id. at 1018 n.48 (citing United States v. Brown, 381
U.S. 437 (1965)).
36 Id. at 1018 n.49 (citing United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
violate the freedom of association is when it de-
nies government benefits or privileges because an
individual holds membership in a certain organi-
zation."' For example, the Court has held that
membership in the Communist Party alone does
not justify denying an individual the opportunity
to practice law,3 2 to work in the merchant
marine, 33 to travel abroad with the protection of a
United States passport,34 to serve as an officer or
employee of a labor union,3 5 or to work in a de-
fense facility.36 Courts have justified denial of a
governmental benefit for membership in other-
wise protected organizations in very limited situa-
tions. 37 For instance, persons who hate children
or speak ill of them-something that the First
Amendment protects-have no right to work for a
public day care. 38 The Court also has held that
partisan political activities by federal employees
must be limited if the government is to operate
effectively and fairly.3 9
D. The Right Not to Associate Is Also
Protected by the First Amendment
The Supreme Court also recognizes a right not
to associate under the First Amendment.40 In
other words, individuals and associations have a
constitutional right not to be compelled to sup-
port (financially or otherwise) expressive activities
by organizations of which they do not approve. 4'
The "right not to associate" also implies that an
association has a First Amendment interest in not
being forced to accept unwanted members. 4 2 For
258 (1967)).
37 Id. at 1018.
38 Id. at 1018 n.54 (citing Hollon v. Pierce, 64 Cal. Rptr.
808 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1967) (holding that a city may
discharge school bus driver who believes in the religious sac-
rifice of children)).
39 Id. (citing United States Civil Service Comm'n v. Nat'l
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (upholding a
prohibition on federal employees taking an active part in po-
litical management or political campaigns)).
40 N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1,
13 (1988) (holding that the forced inclusion of an unwanted
person in a group infringes the groups freedom of expressive
association if the presence of that person affects in a signifi-
cant way the group's ability to advocate public or private
viewpoints).
41 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 241
(1977) (holding that nonunion employees have a constitu-
tional right not to have their service fees used for support of
ideological causes of which they disapproved).
42 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 580 (holding that the right not to
associate allows private parties who conduct a parade to ex-
clude unwanted members from the parade).
2001]
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example, applying a public accommodation anti-
discrimination law to a private group for the pur-
pose of forcing that private group to reinstate a
member whose views were contrary to that of the
private group violates the First Amendment.43
E. When Government Significantly Interferes
With an Association's Internal Structure or
Organization, It Violates the Freedom of
Association
When the government interferes significantly
with an organization's internal structure without a
compelling interest, it violates the First Amend-
ment freedom of association.44 For example, the
Supreme Court held that when a state attempts to
control defrocking procedures in a religious or-
ganization, it violates the First Amendment.45 The
Court also has invalidated state attempts to deny a
campus organization the opportunity to use state
college facilities to disseminate its views. 46 Addi-
tionally, the imposition of tort damages against
boycotters who may cause injury to a business that
engages in discriminatory practices violates the
freedom of expression.47
State interference with the internal structure of
a political organization or procedures at a na-
tional political convention implicates the freedom
of association. 48 For instance, the Supreme Court
has held that when a state attempts to control the
procedures of a national political convention, it
violates the freedom of association held by the na-
tional political party or its state equivalent.49
Other instances when state interference with a po-
litical organization's internal structure violates the
First Amendment occur when the state tries to
prevent a political party from seeking to broaden
43 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2457
(2000) (holding that application of a state public accommo-
dation law to a private organization for the purpose of forc-
ing inclusion of a homosexual when the organization does
not agree with homosexuality violates the First Amendment
and freedom of association).
44 TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1016.
45 Id. at 1016 n.32 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (invalidating attempted
state control of the procedures of the Serbian Orthodox
Church)).
46 Id. at 1016 n.33 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,
194 (1972) (invalidating a state college's refusal to permit a
Students for a Democratic Society chapter from holding
meetings on campus)).
47 Id. at 1016 n.35 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 931-32 (1982)).
its appeal by including nonmembers in its pri-
mary election. 50
II. CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY v.
JONES
Until 1996, California held what is known as a
"closed" partisan primary in which only persons
who are members of the political party (or those
who have declared affiliation with that party) may
vote for that party's nominee. 51 In 1996, Califor-
nia voters adopted Proposition 198,52 which
changed California's partisan primary from a
closed primary to a blanket primary.53 Four politi-
cal parties (the California Democratic Party, the
California Republican Party, the Libertarian Party
of California, and the Peace and Freedom Party)
brought suit challenging Proposition 198 in the
United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of California.5 4 Each of the plaintiffs had a
rule prohibiting nonmembers from voting in the
party's California primary.55 Therefore, these four
political parties argued that Proposition 198 vio-
lated their First Amendment right of association
and sought injunctive relief against California. 56
The district court, following recent Supreme
Court precedent, applied a two-step analysis to de-
termine if Proposition 198 violated the First
Amendment.57 In applying the first step of the
analysis, which was to determine the character
and magnitude of the burdens that the blanket
primary imposed on the political parties' associa-
tional right, the district court concluded the bur-
den imposed on the plaintiffs' right of association
by Proposition 198 was not severe. 58 They further
recognized that Proposition 198 might place a
burden on a political party by causing it to select a
48 Id. at 1016 n.31 (citing FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Ac-
tion Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985)).
49 Id. (citing Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) (in-
validating state control of the procedures of a national politi-
cal convention)).
50 Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 228 (holding that a state statute
preventing nonparty members from voting in a statewide
closed primary is unconstitutional).
51 Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2405.
52 Id.
53 id. at 2405-06.
54 Jones, 984 F. Supp. at 1292.
55 Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2402, 2406.
56 Jones, 984 F. Supp. at 1292.
57 Id. at 1294 (following Timmons v. Twin Cities Area
New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)).
58 Id. at 1300-01.
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nominee different from the one that party mem-
bers would select (or perhaps cause the same
nominee to commit himself to positions that dif-
fer from the party position), but nonetheless con-
cluded that this burden did not greatly interfere
with the political parties' freedom of associa-
tion. 59
The district court then applied the second part
of its constitutional analysis, which requires a
court to consider the state's interests and weigh
the strength of those interests against the particu-
lar burdens placed on the political parties' associ-
ational right. 60 The court found that California's
asserted state interests in increasing the "repre-
sentativeness" of elected officials chosen by the
open primary process, giving voters greater
choice, and increasing voter turnout and partici-
pation in the primary, were substantial and com-
pelling.61 Because California's asserted state inter-
ests were compelling and Proposition 198
imposed a minimal burden on plaintiff's right of
association, the district court held that it was con-
stitutional. 62 The district court also recognized
that a clear majority of voters, with a convincing
margin from both major parties, supported the
proposition.63 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, adopting the district court's opinion as
its own.64 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed.6 5
The Supreme Court majority, applying strict
scrutiny, concluded that the single blanket pri-
mary system enacted by Proposition 198 was un-
constitutional. 66 The Court held that respon-
dents' state interests of "ensuring that
disenfranchised citizens have an effective vote,
producing elected officials who better represent
the electorate, and expanding political debate be-
yond partisan concerns' 67 were insufficient to jus-
tify the burden imposed by Proposition 198 on pe-
titioners' freedom of association. The Court
concluded that state interests could not justify a
59 Id. at 1299-1300.
60 Id. at 1301.
61 Id. at 1301-03.
62 Id. at 1303.
63 1I.
64 Jones, 169 F.3d at 647-48.
65 Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2413.
66 Id. at 2412-14.
67 Id. at 2412-13.
68 Id. at 2409 (quoting Wisconsin, 450 U.S. at 126).
69 Id. at 2407.
70 Id. (quoting Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442
"substantial intrusion into the associational free-
dom of members of a national political party. 6
The majority then illustrated that states have a
compelling interest to ensure that the election
ballot is not burdened with frivolous candida-
cies. 69 Therefore, a state may require parties to
demonstrate "a significant modicum of support"
among a majority of voters, while not violating the
First Amendment freedom of association. 70 The
majority also argued that a state has a compelling
interest in preventing party raiding.7a In doing so,
"a state may require party registration in a reason-
able period of time before the actual primary
election. ' 72 The Court reasoned, however, that
any regulation that attempts to further a compel-
ling state interest must be narrowly tailored so as
not to offend a political party's First Amendment
rights. 73
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Jones,
specifically recognized a political party's First
Amendment right "to join together in further-
ance of common political beliefs. '74 Implicit in
this right is the freedom to identify people who
"constitute the association and to limit the associa-
tion only to those people. '75 Therefore, the ma-
jority asserted that a political party has a right not
to associate with those outside the party. 76 The
majority also found that a political party's right to
exclude is especially important during the process
of selecting party nominees. 77 According to the
majority, the nomination selection process "often
determines the party's positions on significant
public policy issues of the day[,] and even when
those positions are predetermined[,] it is the
nominee who becomes the ambassador to the
general electorate in winning it over to the party's
view."'78 As a result, the majority reasoned that
Proposition 198 interfered with a party's right not
to associate because it forces a political party to
associate with a nominee with differing positions
from that of the party. 79
(1971)).
71 Id. (defining party raiding as "a process in which dedi-
cated members of one party formally switch to another party
to alter the outcome of that party's primary").
72 Id.
73 Id. at 2412.
74 Id. at 2408 (quoting Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214-15).
75 Id. (quoting Wisconsin, 450 U.S. at 122).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 2409.
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The majority of the Court also argued that Pro-
position 198 violated the First Amendment free-
dom not to associate because "it force [d] political
parties to have their nominees and hence their
positions determined by those who have refused
to affiliate with the party and may have expressly
affiliated with a rival [political party.]" 80 To bol-
ster this conclusion, Justice Scalia cited a survey
showing that having a party's nominee deter-
mined by persons of an opposing party under a
blanket primary was clearly a problem."' The sur-
vey of California voters found that 37% of Repub-
licans indicated that they planned to vote in the
1998 Democratic gubernatorial primary, and 20%
of Democrats stated that they planned to vote in
the 1998 Republican and United States Senate
primary.8 2 Finally, Justice Scalia concluded that
the burden Proposition 198 placed on petition-
ers' right of political association was "both severe
and unnecessary" because it forced political par-
ties to associate with those who did not share their
political beliefs.8 3
Justice Kennedy, concurring, argued that re-
spondents' justification for Proposition 198 was
"doubtful."' 4 Justice Kennedy attacked respon-
dents' assertion that a political party has alterna-
tive means to protect its freedom of association
using its funds and resources to support the can-
didate of its choice.i 5 Kennedy argued that recent
Supreme Court decisions placed strict limitations
on a political party's ability to use its own funds
and resources to support the candidate of its
choice, and therefore seriously impeded a politi-
cal party's First Amendment right of association . 6
Because of this impediment, Kennedy believed
that the problem would be further compounded
80 Id.
81 Id. at 2410.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 2414.
84 Id. at 2414-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
85 Id. at 2415 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
86 Id. (Kennedy,J., concurring) (citing Colo. Republican
Campaign Comm'n v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604,
624-25 (1996) (holding the Federal Election Campaign Act
(2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (3)), imposing a limitation on the Colo-
rado Republican Party's expenditures in U.S. Senate cam-
paign, violates the party's rights under the First Amend-
ment)); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000)
(holding that a Missouri statute imposing contributions to
candidates for political office does not violate the First and
Fourteenth Amendment). But see Press Release, Federal Elec-
tion Commission, Major Parties 18 Month Fundraising
Figures Summarized, at http://www.fec.gov/press/pty/
1800.text.htm (Sept. 27, 2000) [hereinafter 18 Month FEC
if the Court upheld Proposition 198.87
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dis-
sented and argued that Proposition 198 was con-
stitutional.8 8 Stevens first argued that the princi-
ples of federalism required the Court to respect
the policy choice made by California voters when
they approved Proposition 198.89 Stevens then as-
serted that Proposition 198 did not abridge a po-
litical organization's freedom of association be-
cause it furthered the compelling state interests of
expanding an individual's ability to participate in
the democratic process and increasing voter par-
ticipation.90 The dissent also argued, siding with
District Court Judge Levi, that Proposition 198
was narrowly tailored because it did not limit a po-
litical party from engaging in other traditional
party behavior, such as ensuring orderly internal
party governance and maintaining party disci-
pline.9 1 The dissent then asserted that the right
not to associate is "simply inapplicable to partici-
pation in a state election."92 They argued that a
state election, unlike a convention or caucus, is a
public affair that involved government regulation
through public activities aimed at opening up the
political process (as proposition 198 tried to do in
California) .o' The dissent also pointed out that al-
though a party's First Amendment protection ex-
tended to a party's right to invite independents to
participate in its primaries,9 4 it did not impose a
limit on a state's power to open up its primary
elections to eligible voters. °5
In addition to its First Amendment analysis, the
dissent addressed the application of Proposition
198 to elections for U.S. Senators and Representa-
tives.9 6 The dissent specifically addressed the diffi-
culty that could arise under the Election Clause of
Release] (disclosing that all state Republican committees had
$22,050,093 million cash in hand from Jan. 1, 1999 through
June 30, 2000, and state Democratic committees had
$6,799,384 million cash in hand of $40.4 million from the
same period).
87 Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2416 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
88 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 2416-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 2419 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 2418 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (comparing Pro-
position 198 with Timmons, 520 U.S. at 360 (holding that
"regulation of endorsement implicates political parties' inter-
nal affairs and core associational activities")).
92 Id. at 2419 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9- Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing Tashjian, 479 U.S. at
208).
95 Id. at 2417 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 2416 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the United States Constitution.9 7 The dissent as-
serted that Proposition 198 might be unconstitu-
tional under the Elections Clause of the Constitu-
tion because initiative systems are unreviewable by
independent legislative action.9 8 However, be-
cause neither party raised this point nor did the
courts below discuss it, Justice Stevens reserved
judgment on this question. 99
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION PRECEDENT IN
REVIEWING STATE ELECTION LAWS
A. The Supreme Court's Test for Election Laws
Affecting the Right to Associate
In Anderson v. Celebreeze,1°0 the Supreme Court
articulated a two-part test used in constitutional
challenges to state election laws. I0 ' A court must
first compare the "character and magnitude of
the asserted injury to rights protected by the First
Amendment" that the plaintiff seeks to vindi-
cate. 10 2 It must then "identify and evaluate the
precise interests put forward by the state asjustifi-
cations for the burden imposed by its rule" on a
political party's associational freedom. 10 3 When
the court passes judgment on state election laws,
it "must not only determine the legitimacy and
strength of each of the asserted state interests,
[but also] it must consider the extent to which
those state interests make it necessary to burden
the plaintiffs rights." 10 4 In short, this test requires
a court to weigh the asserted state interests against
the alleged constitutional injury, and then con-
sider the fit between the asserted interests and the
challenged state regulation.
The petitioner in Anderson was an independent
candidate for president. The petitioner and three
other voters brought an action challenging the
constitutionality of an Ohio statute that required
independent candidates to file in March of an
97 Id. at 2416 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 4, cl. I ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding
elections for Senators and Representatives shall be pre-
scribed in each state by the Legislature thereof.")).
98 Id. at 2423 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
101 Id. at 789.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 782-83.
election year in order to appear on the general
election ballot in November. 115 Applying the two-
part test first developed in Williams v. Rhodes,""
the Court first assessed the burden that the state
statute imposed on independent candidates.'1 7
The Court found that setting a deadline simulta-
neously precluded independent candidates from
entering the presidential race after March and
limited the effectiveness of independent candi-
dates who attempted to meet the March dead-
line.1 0 8 Therefore, the Court found that the law
burdened the associational voting right of Ander-
son's supporters and other "independent-minded
voters."109
After the Court determined that Ohio's March
deadline violated Anderson's First Amendment
right of association, it then assessed the legitimacy
of Ohio's asserted state interests in voter educa-
tion, equal treatment for all candidates and politi-
cal stability, as well as the extent to which the chal-
lenged law served these interests. 10 The Court
found the first interest "important and legiti-
mate"' but concluded that the state's interest in
voter education did not justify the specific restric-
tion on participation in a presidential election.' 12
Similarly, the Court concluded that the state's in-
terest in equal treatment of partisan and indepen-
dent candidates "simply is not achieved by impos-
ing the March filing deadline on both."' 13 Finally,
the Court rejected the state's interest in political
stability because it was "not precisely drawn to
protect the parties from 'intraparty' feuding,
whatever legitimacy that state goal may have in a
presidential election." 1 4 The Court ultimately in-
validated Ohio's filing deadline because the bur-
den on a candidate's freedom of association "un-
questionably outweigh[ed] the State's minimal
interest in imposing a March deadline."' '15
In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,"16
the Court applied the Anderson two-part test and
106 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968).
107 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783, 786.
108 Id. at 792.
109 Id. at 792-93.
110 Id. at 796-805.
'I Id. at 795.
112 Id.
13 Id. at 801.
1'4 Id. at 805.
115 Id.
I16 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
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invalidated Connecticut's closed primary statute,
which required voters in a political primary to be
registered members of that party. 11 7 The Connect-
icut Republican Party, seeking to allow unaffili-
ated voters to participate in the Republican pri-
mary, challenged the constitutional validity of
Connecticut's closed primary statute.'8 Because
the Connecticut law required voters in any party
primary to be registered members of a political
party, it precluded unaffiliated voters from voting
in the Republican primary. The Republican Party,
which had previously adopted a party rule permit-
ting unaffiliated or "independent" voters to vote
in its primary, argued that Connecticut's closed
primary statute violated its First and Fourteenth
Amendment right of association.' 19 The district
court, 120 the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit 1 21 and the Supreme Court 12 2 all concurred
and held that the statute impermissibly interfered
with the Republican Party's freedom of associa-
tion right.
In applying the Anderson test, the Court found
that the challenged statutes burdened the right of
the political party and its members to freely asso-
ciate. The Court noted that "the freedom to join
together in furtherance of common political be-
liefs 'necessarily presupposes the freedom to iden-
tify the people who constitute the associa-
tion.' "123 The Court found that Connecticut's
closed primary statute limited the Republican
Party's "associational opportunities at the crucial
juncture [in] which the appeal to common princi-
ples may be translated into concerted action, and
hence to political power in the community." 124
Apparently this burden was sufficient to trigger
strict scrutiny review because the Court subse-
quently applied it when it invalidated the Con-
necticut statute. 25
17 Id. at 213-14.
118 Id. at 213.
119 Id.
120 Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 599 F. Supp
1228, 1241 (D. Conn. 1984).
121 Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 770 F.2d. 265,
283 (2d Cir. 1985).
122 Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 228.
123 Id. at 214 (quoting Wisconsin, 450 U.S. at 107).
124 Id. at 216.
125 Id. at 217 (addressing whether Connecticut's statute
was "narrowly tailored... [to address] the state's compelling
interests").
126 Id. at 216-24.
Connecticut asserted four compelling interests
in Tashjian to justify the challenged state law. 126
These interests were "minimizing the administra-
tive burden of the party system," "preventing raid-
ing, avoiding voter confusion, and protecting the
responsibility of party government.'127 The Court
found that Connecticut's first asserted interest-
the administrative burden posed by opening up
the primary election-was "not a sufficient ba-
sis ... for infringing appellees' First Amendment
rights."' 128 In response to the state's asserted com-
pelling interest in preventing party raiding, 129 the
Court stated that while a legitimate interest, it
"was not implicated here."""() The Court held that
the statute actually assisted party raiders because
the statute permitted an independent to affiliate
with a political party as late as noon on the busi-
ness day preceding the primary.' 3 ' The Court
classified the state's interest in preventing voter
confusion and providing for educated and re-
sponsible voter decisions as legitimate. 132 Because
the Court classified this interest as legitimate, it
concluded that it in no respect made it necessary
to burden the Connecticut Republican Party's
right.13  The Court subsequently concluded that
none of these interests were substantial and held
that the statute, as applied to the party in this
case, was unconstitutional. 3
4
Finally, the Court addressed Connecticut's
fourth compelling interest "in protecting the in-
tegrity of the [two-party] system and the responsi-
bility of party government."' 135 While the Court
found this interest compelling, it nonetheless con-
cluded that neither a state nor a court may "sub-
stitute its own judgment for that of the party."'136
After Tashjian, it is clear that the Court had ex-
panded the role of unaffiliated voters by allowing
them to participate in partisan political primaries.
127 Id. at 220.
128 Id. at 218.
129 Id. at 219 (quoting Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S.
752, 760 (1973) (defining party raiding as a practice
"whereby voters in sympathy with one party designate them-
selves as voters of another party so [as] to influence or deter-
mine the results of the other party's primary")).
13 Id. at 219.
'31 Id.
132 Id.
1' Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796).
134 I. at 225.
35 Id. at 222.
136 Id. at 224 (citing Wisconsin, 450 U.S. at 123-24).
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B. The Supreme Court Will Apply Strict
Scrutiny When Using the Anderson Analysis
if the Regulation Severely Burdens a Party's
Assocational Right
In Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Central Commit-
tee, 137 the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny
when it used the Anderson analysis for assessing
the constitutionality of provisions of California's
state election laws, which regulated the internal
structure and organization of political parties. 138
The Court specifically addressed whether provi-
sions of the California Election Code banning po-
litical parties' governing bodies from endorsing
primary candidates violated those political parties'
speech and association rights under the First
Amendment. 3 9 The Court, citing Anderson, as-
sessed whether the challenged law burdened
"rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."' 40 The Court then outlined its
next step of the inquiry: "If the challenged law
burdens the rights of political parties and their
members, it can survive constitutional scrutiny
only if the state shows that it advances a compel-
ling state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest." 1 4 1
Petitioners in Eu challenged provisions of the
California Election Code, which prohibited the
official governing bodies of political parties from
endorsing candidates in primaries and imposed
various restrictions on the internal governance of
political parties.1 42 Specifically, the restrictions on
internal governance included "the size and com-
position of the state central committees; set forth
rules governing the selection and removal of com-
mittee members; fix[ed] the maximum term of
office for the chair of the state central committee;
[and] requir[ed] that the chair rotate between re-
sidents of northern and southern California."' 143
Applying strict scrutiny in its use of the Anderson
test to the endorsement ban challenged in Eu, the
Court found first that the state election code pro-
visions barring party endorsements during party
primaries and heavily regulating their internal or-
ganization, burdened the parties' First and Four-
137 489 U.S. 214, 225 (1988).
138 Id. at 222.
139 Id. at 216, 221-22.
140 Id. at 222.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 218.
143 Id. at 219.
144 Id. at 222-25.
teenth Amendment rights (namely their freedom
of association).14 4 Then the Court moved to the
second step of the Anderson standard and applied
strict scrutiny to the challenged state law. The
Court held that the law was not narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling governmental interest. 45
In an attempt to justify the ban on party en-
dorsements and the heavy regulation of the par-
ties' internal organization, California offered two
compelling interests: "stable government and pro-
tecting voters from confusion and undue influ-
ence."'146 The Court rejected the two asserted gov-
ernmental interests as insufficient' to pass
constitutional muster. As for the state of Califor-
nia's argument that the ban promoted stable gov-
ernment, the Court concluded that California
had never explained how "banning parties from
endorsing or opposing primary candidates ad-
vanced that interest."147 When rejecting this argu-
ment, the Court quoted Tashjian and stated that
"a state may enact laws to 'prevent the disruption
of the political parties from without,' but not, as
in this case, laws 'to prevent the parties from tak-
ing internal steps affecting their own process for
the selection of candidates.' "148 The Court then
turned to the state's second asserted governmen-
tal interest and noted that "the State has a legiti-
mate interest in fostering an informed electo-
rate." 149 It, however, concluded that this interest
was not served by a ban on party endorsements
because such a rule actually restricts the flow of
information to voters.1 50
C. The Court Uses Heightened Scrutiny in Its
Two-Part Constitutional Analysis of Election
Laws if the Laws Do Not Severely Burden a
Party's Constitutional Rights
In 1997, the Supreme Court decided Timmons
v. Twin Cities Area New Party.'51 In Timmons, the
Court used heightened scrutiny when it applied
the Anderson analysis to a Minnesota election law,
which prohibited an individual from appearing
on the ballot as the candidate for more than one
145 Id. at 233.
146 Id. at 226.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 227 (quoting Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224).
149 Id. at 228.
150 Id. at 228-29.
151 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
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r4
political party. 152 This practice of "nomination by
more than one political party of the same candi-
date for the same office in the same general elec-
tion" is called "fusion."'153 The Court concluded
that Minnesota's statute banning fusion candi-
dates was constitutional. 154 Applying the first part
of the Anderson test, the Court determined that
the fusion ban did "not severely burden that
party's associational [right]."'' 5 Because the fu-
sion ban did not severely burden the Twin Cities
Area New Party's First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights, it survived constitutional challenge
on heightened scrutiny grounds.156
The Timmons' Court distinguished between the
burden imposed by a fusion ban and the burden
of state laws governing the internal affairs of a po-
litical party.157 The Court compared Timmons with
Eu and reasserted its analytical point that "regula-
tion of political parties' internal affairs and core
associational activities impose too great a burden
to withstand constitutional scrutiny."'15 The
Court contrasted those regulations with ones that
merely precluded a candidate already on the bal-
lot from being nominated by a second political
party.159 The Court noted that the fusion ban sim-
ply limits a candidate for political office to a single
party nomination. It does not prohibit any one
party from nominating a candidate. Because the
fusion ban only minimally burdened the political
parties' First and Fourteenth Amendment right of
association, Minnesota's asserted interests in "pro-
moting candidate competition . . . preventing
electoral distortions and ballot manipulations,
and discouraging party splintering"'"i were "cor-
respondingly weighty."'16 1 Therefore, Minnesota's
fusion ban did not unconstitutionally burden peti-
tioners' freedom of association. 62 As a result, the
Timmons' Court concluded that Minnesota's inter-
ests were sufficient to withstand this heightened
scrutiny review and upheld the fusion ban as con-
stitutional. 163
It is clear from Tashjian and Timmons that the
two-part balancing test first articulated in Anderson
152 Id. at 354.
153 Id. (quoting Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna,
73 F.3d 196, 197-98 (8th Cir. 1996)).
154 Id. at 353-54.
155 Id. at 359 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
440 n.10 (1992)).
156 Id. at 363-64.
'57 Id. at 362.
158 Id. at 360 (comparing Timmons with Tashjian and Eu
and noting that the statutes at issue in Tashjian and Eu in-
is the appropriate standard to assess the validity of
state laws that allegedly infringe on the freedom
of association although the Court uses it in vary-
ing degrees depending on the circumstances of
each case.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT ERRED WHEN IT
BANNED BLANKET PRIMARIES IN
CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY V.
JONES
A. The Majority Opinion in Jones
Before discussing the errors of the Scalia major-
ity in Jones, it is useful to note that its reasoning
for striking down Proposition 198 was that it of-
fended political parties' freedom of association.
The majority first outlined the background of the
litigation and then turned to the standard of re-
view that it would apply in evaluating the constitu-
tional challenge posed by this case. The majority,
using strict scrutiny, applied the first part of the
Anderson test and concluded that Proposition 198
severely burdened petitioners' First Amendment
right to associate because it forced state political
parties to affiliate with candidates and voters who
refused to participate with the party and have ex-
pressly associated with a rival political party.1 64
After determining that Proposition 198 severely
burdened petitioners' right of association, the
Court applied the second part of Anderson and
considered California's seven interests offered as
justifications for Proposition 198, and whether
Proposition 198 was a narrowly tailored means of
furthering them. 165 The interests that California
offered the Court were: (1) "producing elected of-
ficials who better represented the electorate"; (2)
"expanding candidate debate beyond narrow par-
tisan political concerns"; (3) ensuring that a dis-
enfranchised person had an effective vote"; (4)
"promoting fairness"; (5) "affording voters
greater choice"; (6) "increasing voter participa-
volved regulation of political parties' internal affairs, whereas
the Minnesota statute in Timmons banning fusion candidates
did not).
159 Id. at 363.
160 Id. at 364.
161 Id. at 369-70.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2408, 2410.
165 Id. at 2412.
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tion"; (7) and "protecting privacy."166 The Court
held that the seven interests that the state offered
were compelling. 167 The majority then concluded
that Proposition 198 was not a narrowly tailored
means of furthering California's seven proffered
state interests and that the burden Proposition
198 placed on petitioners' right of political associ-
ation was both severe and unnecessary, and there-
fore unconstitutional. 1 6
B. The Majority Erred in Applying the Anderson
Test to Jones
The Anderson test should be applied to any state
regulation that infringes on the right of free asso-
ciation. 1 69 The Court previously utilized this test
to assess the constitutionality of challenged state
election statutes in Anderson, Tashjian, Eu and
Timmons. The test, as articulated in these cases, re-
quires a court to first assess the constitutional bur-
den that the challenged law imposes on state po-
litical parties' associational freedom. Then a court
must analyze the state interests offered as ajustifi-
cation for the challenged regulation while consid-
ering the necessity of the regulation in protecting
those interests. 1 70
1. Proposition 198 Does Not Severely Burden the
Parties' First Amendment Right of Association
A court's first step under Anderson is to deter-
166 Id. at 2412-13.
167 Id. at 2414.
168 Id.
169 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
170 Id.
171 Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2414.
172 Id. at 2410.
173 See id. at 2411.
174 Id.
175 Jones, 169 F.3d at 659 (holding that the magnitude of
the burdens Proposition 198 imposes on the political parties
are not characterized as either "severe" or as "negligible"); cf
Brian M. Castro, Note, Smothering Freedom of Association: The
Alaska Supreme Court Errs in Upholding The State's Blanket Pri-
mary Statute, 14 ALAsKA L. REV. 523, 524. (2000) [hereinafter
Castro]. Castro argues that the Alaska State Supreme Court
erred in upholding Alaska's blanket primary statute when it
decided 0' Callighan v. Alaska, 914 P.2d 1250 (1996), be-
cause it failed to subject Alaska's blanket primary statute to
strict scrutiny when it applied the Anderson test. The strict
scrutiny test should have been used because the primary stat-
ute severely burdened the associational right of the Alaskan
Republican Party and its members by requiring them to in-
clude members of other political parties in the Republican
primary. See Castro, this note.
176 Jason M. Miller, Note, Chapter 18 and the 2000 Presi-
dential Primary Election: Undermining The Purpose behind the
mine what constitutional burden the law imposes
on the parties asserted constitutional rights. The
majority opinion, authored by Scalia, held that
Proposition 198 "severely" burdened the petition-
ers' rights. 171 The Jones majority believed that "evi-
dence demonstrates that under California's blan-
ket primary system, the prospect of having a
political party's nominee determined by adher-
ents of an opposing party is far from remote, in-
deed, it is a clear and present danger[,]" and as a
result violates a political party's freedom of associ-
ation. 172 Additionally, the majority used respon-
dents' own expert's opinion and contended that
blanket primaries placed a significant burden on
the parties' freedom of association.17 3 The Court
specifically highlighted the expert's conclusion
that "the policy positions of Members of Congress
elected from blanket primary states are . . . more
reflective of the preferences of the mass of voters
at the center of the ideological spectrum."'174
Contrary to the majority opinion in Jones, Pro-
position 198 does not severely burden the major
political parties' First Amendment freedom of as-
sociation.175 Party rules17 6 and other portions of
the California Election Code177 provide alterna-
tives for parties who are unsatisfied with the re-
sults of a blanket primary. Additionally, a political
party also could preserve its constitutional right to
select a standard-bearer with views that best re-
"Open" Primary Act, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 339, 400 (2000)
[hereinafter Miller]. Miller argues that Section 15375(c) of
the California Election Code disregards the expressed will of
California voters, who demonstrated their preference for a
blanket primary system through Proposition 198 because the
section permits the political parties to apportion delegates
based on blanket primary results in accordance with party
rules. Id. (citing CAL. ELEC. CODE § 15375(c) (West Supp.
2000)). The Democratic Party Rule states that participation
in delegate selection shall be open only to voters who partici-
pate as Democrats; the Republican provision, Rule 34(f),
which the party amended after the citizens of California ap-
proved Proposition 198, provides that:
No state law . . . shall be observed that allows persons
who have participated or are participating in the selec-
tion of any nominee of a party other than the Republi-
can Party, included but not limited to, through the use
of a multi-party primary or similar type ballot, to partici-
pate in the selection of a nominee of the Republican in
the selection of any nominee of a party other than the
Republican Party, including a multi-party primary or
similar type ballot, to participate in the selection of the
nominee of the Republican Party.
Id. at 400 n.3, 4.
177 Id. at 406 (discussing and citing CAL. ELEC. CODE
§ 15375(c)). Section 15375(c) requires that the results of the
primary election "to be reported according to the number of
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present its rights and ideologies by selectively dis-
tributing party funds to a candidate with views
that are with the political party's views. 178 Finally,
the majority's contention in Jones that Proposition
198 severely burdens a political party's right to as-
sociation because it forces political candidates to
move toward the center of the political spectrum
in order to appeal to most voters, is misplaced. Po-
litical parties alter their traditional party positions
during each election cycle in order to achieve vic-
tory. Because each political party has rules and
other internal mechanisms available to offset pri-
mary results that contradict party beliefs, Proposi-
tion 198 did not severely burden petitioners' First
Amendment right of association. Therefore, the
Jones majority should have analyzed Proposition
198 under an Anderson-type heightened scrutiny
standard of review instead of applying strict scru-
tiny and invalidating a citizen initiative like Pro-
position 198.
2. The Majority Erred in Applying Strict Scrutiny to
California's Interests Because Proposition 198 Did
Not Severely Impact the Political Parties' First
Amendment Rights
Because Proposition 198 did not interfere with
the internal organization of either party and both
political parties had mechanisms in place to en-
sure that candidates who best represented their
views were selected in the primary elections, it did
not severely impact the political parties' associa-
tional right. Anderson and its progeny, therefore,
require the application of heightened scrutiny.
Consequently, when the majority in Jones applied
strict scrutiny to Proposition 198, it erred. 179 The
votes each candidate received from all voters and separately
according to the number of votes each candidate received
from voters affiliated with each political party qualified to
participate in the presidential primary." CAL. ELEC. CODE
§ 15375(c).
178 18 Month FEC Release, supra note 86. The release re-
ported that both political parties continue to raise record
amounts of nonfederal or "soft money" funds outside the
limits and prohibitions of the Federal Election Campaign
Act: Republicans raised $130.2 million, an 81% increase over
the same period in 1997-98 and 65% over 1995-96; Demo-
crats collected $124.2 million, an 134% increase over
1997-98 and 77% more than 1995-96. Because the FEC can-
not regulate soft money, both political parties are able to
freely control how much and to which candidate they allo-
cate their money, in effect, preserving the freedom of associ-
ation embodied in the First Amendment. Id.
179 See, e.g., 7immons, 520 U.S. at 363-64. Timmons held
Court in Jones should have required that Califor-
nia justify Proposition 198 by showing that it
served an important state objective, and that a
reasonable relationship existed between Proposi-
tion 198 and California's state objectives. These
objectives included ensuring that all persons en-
joy the right to an effective vote. Had the majority
utilized heightened scrutiny review, it would have
upheld California's blanket primary law as consti-
tutional.
California argued that Proposition 198 served
seven legitimate interests.180 California first as-
serted that it had a compelling interest in produc-
ing elected officials who better represent the elec-
torate by expanding political debate beyond
purely partisan concerns.' 8 In opening up Cali-
fornia's state primary system to independent vot-
ers, Proposition 198 would likely force elected of-
ficials to address the needs of a wider electorate.
With Proposition 198 in place, an elected official
would be forced to expand his or her message be-
yond the narrow interests of the party stalwart.
California then argued to the Court in Jones
that it had a legitimate interest in ensuring that
disenfranchised voters (i.e., independent and
members of the minority party in politically "safe"
districts dominated by one political party) would
have an effective vote.' 8 2 Just as it is a rational
means for opening up political debate beyond a
partisan audience at the state party convention,
Proposition 198 also ensures that every citizen
who votes in a primary will have a significant say
in who will be the standard-bearer in the general
election. The majority is inaccurate when they
suggest that the only way for a citizen to not "dis-
enfranchise himself""" is to join a political party.
that state regulatory interests need only be "sufficiently
weighty" to justify limitations placed on a political party's
right of association when state election laws that do not re-
strict the ability of political parties to endorse, support or
vote for anyone they like, or impose on a party's internal
structure or governance. Id. Arguably when the Court de-
scribes a state interest as "sufficiently weighty," it subjects the
state interest and the state regulation (in this case it would be
an election regulation) advancing the sufficiently weighty in-
terest to heightened constitutional review, instead of strict
scrutiny.
180 Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2412.
181 Id. But see Castro, supra note 175, at 547 (arguing that
the general election, not the primary, is the time for making
candidates more representative to voters).
182 Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2413.
183 Id.
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Merely joining a political party does not solve the
problem of effective voter disenfranchisement in
safe political districts. A voter may join a political
party in hopes that the party will choose candi-
dates who support the voter's position, only to be-
come disenfranchised again when the party nomi-
nates a candidate whom the voter finds
inadequate. The state certainly has an interest in
promoting fairness in elections as the Court in
Jones recognized. t84 Proposition 198 aids this state
interest by assuring that nonparty members in
"safe districts" have more input in deciding who
will be their nominee in the general election. 185
California also argued in Jones that it had a legit-
imate state interest in increasing voter participa-
tion in primary elections because government be-
comes more representative as more people vote.
One effective way to increase voter turnout is to
offer them a wider choice of candidates. Proposi-
tion 198 would allow any registered voter, includ-
ing those who are unaffiliated with any political
party, to vote for any candidate regardless of the
candidate's political affiliation.' 86 This would en-
courage voters to cross party lines and vote for
candidates who had wide political appeal. Addi-
tionally, California's asserted state interest fares
well when considered in the light of the minimal
burden imposed by the challenged statute in Jones
on the associational right held by political parties
and their members. For instance, Proposition 198
does not interfere with either party's internal gov-
ernance or organization, 8 7 and each party has
rules or other means to invalidate a primary that
is contrary to their positions. 188 It is also impor-
tant to note that California voters from both par-
ties overwhelmingly voted in favor of Proposition
198.189 Therefore, in striking down this statute,
the majority largely ignored the voice of the citi-
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 CAL ELEC. CODE § 2001.
187 See id.
188 See Miller, supra note 176, at 400 n.4 (citing DNC and
RNC Presidential Delegation Rules that allow only Republi-
cans to participate in the nomination of the Republican pres-
idential candidate and or Democrats to participate in the
nomination of the Democratic presidential candidate). See
generally supra note 176.
189 Jones, 169 F.3d at 649 (citing that Proposition 198
passed 59.51% to 40.49%, and within this number 61% of
Democrats and 57% of Republicans voted in favor of Proposi-
tion 198, while 69% of independents voted in favor).
190 Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2416 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that principles of federalism require the Court to respect
zens of California and their desire to have a more
fair and open election, as well as principles of fed-
eralism. 190
C. The Majority Disregarded Precedent
Protecting a Citizen's Right "to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances"
Through the Initiative Process
In addition to incorrectly applying the Anderson
test, the Jones majority ignored controlling prece-
dent that protects a citizen's right to make laws
directly through initiatives placed on election bal-
lots. For instance, the Court in Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Foundation, 191 afforded the citi-
zen initiative process First Amendment protec-
tion. 19 2 At issue in American Constitutional Law
Foundation was whether certain requirements for
petition circulators (those who disseminate and
gather voter signatures in order for an initiative to
be placed on the ballot) was constitutional. 193
Specifically, the Colorado law challenged in Ameri-
can Constitutional Law Foundation mandated that
petition circulators be registered voters at least 18
years old. 194 The state law also mandated that the
petition circulation period be only six months,195
and that petition circulators wear identification
badges stating their name and their status as
"VOLUNTEER" or "PAID."' 9 6 If the petition cir-
culators were paid, they had to identify the name
and telephone number of their employer. 197 Ad-
ditionally, the Colorado law required petition cir-
culators to attach to each petition section an affi-
davit containing the circulator's name, address,
and a statement that the voter signing the petition
has read and understands the laws governing the
circulation of petitions.198
Relying on prior case law,'9 9 the Court in Ameri-
the policy choice made by California voters in approving Pro-
position 198).
191 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
192 Id. at 199-200.
193 Id. at 188 (citing CoLo. REv. STAT. § 1-40-112(2)
(1998)).
194 American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. at
188 (citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 1-40-112(1)).
195 Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-108(1)).
196 Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT § 1-40-108(2)).
197 Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-112(2)).
198 Id.
199 Id. at 199 (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (determining that an Ohio law
that prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign
literature severely burdens free speech rights)).
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can Constitutional Law Foundation first assessed the
burden that Colorado's petition circulation regu-
lations placed on the petition circulators' First
Amendment rights. 20 0 The American Constitutional
Law Foundation Court determined that that the
disclosure requirements for petition circulators
discouraged participation in the petition process
and therefore severely burdened free speech.2 0 '
Because the badge requirement severely bur-
dened the petitioners' First Amendment rights,
the Court subjected Colorado's asserted interests
to strict scrutiny review.202 Subsequently, the
Court held that the badge requirements failed the
test of constitutionality of strict scrutiny analy-
sis.2 03 The Court held that the badge require-
ments were not sufficiently related to the substan-
tial state interest of protecting the integrity of the
initiative process (specifically to deter fraud and
diminish corruption).204 Therefore, the Colorado
statute was unconstitutional. 20 5 Because the Court
used its two-step Anderson analysis in reviewing the
constitutional challenge posed in American Consti-
tutional Law Foundation, one might argue that the
Court recognized that the citizen's ability to initi-
ate change through the ballot box is a protected
First Amendment right that cannot be infringed
through arbitrary measures.
Unfortunately, the majority in Jones largely ig-
nored the freedom of the collective majority to
"petition the government for a redress of griev-
ances,' '2 0 6 as set out in American Constitutional Law
Foundation.20 7 In his reasoning, Justice Scalia
seemed to ignore the collective citizenry's First
Amendment right in striking down Proposition
198. When he dissented in Romer v. Evans,20 8
Scalia strongly disagreed with the Court for strik-
ing down a citizen initiative that amended the
Colorado state constitution.2 0"  Amendment 2,
which Colorado citizens adopted in a 1992 state-
wide referendum prohibited:
200 Id. at 198-99.
201 Id. at 199.
202 Id. at 204.
203 Id.
204 [d.
205 Id.
206 U.S. Const. amend. I (providing in part that "Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances")
207 Compare American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525
U.S. at 198-200 (recognizing that citizen initiative measures
deserve the utmost First Amendment protection), with.Jones,
120 S. Ct. 2402 (invalidating a citizen passed open primary
law on the grounds it violated partisan political parties' First
the state of Colorado through any of its branches or
departments [and] its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities or school districts [to] enact, adopt, or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy
whereby homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships would constitute or
otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class
of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimina-
tion. 2
10
Scalia argued in his Romer dissent that the ma-
jority in that case had interfered with a "rather
modest attempt by tolerant Coloradans to pre-
serve traditional sexual mores against the efforts
of a politically powerful minority to revise those
mores through the use of the laws." 21 1 Scalia took
a seemingly inconsistent view of citizen initiatives
when it came to protecting the First Amendment
rights of a powerful minority partisan political or-
ganization. 21 2 Because Scalia and others in the
Jones majority failed to recognize the citizens'
rights to affect change through direct democracy
(or citizen initiatives), the Court eliminated one
powerful means to redress grievances against the
government.
V. CONCLUSION
When the Court struck down Proposition 198 it
committed two substantial analytical errors, which
in effect limit the power of citizens to effect
change through direct democracy. First, the
Court erred when it incorrectly applied strict scru-
tiny review to Proposition 198 rather than height-
ened scrutiny (a more relaxed standard ofjudicial
review). Neither major political party suffered any
substantial deprivation of its right to associate as a
result of Proposition 198. Each political party had
sufficient mechanisms in place to nullify an open
primary whose results were contrary to their parti-
san political principles. Second, the Jones Court
also erred when it ignored its own precedent on
Amendment freedom to associate).
208 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 623-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212 Compare Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402, 2410 (holding that
statewide initiative that implements a blanket primary elec-
tion is minimal when compared with protecting the freedom
of association of partisan political organizations), with Romer,
517 U.S. at 635 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
Court trumped "[a] rather ... modest attempt by seemingly
tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional mores against the
efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores
through the use of the laws").
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First Amendment protection given through the
citizen initiative process. As a result, the Jones
Court significantly eroded a fundamental First
Amendment right for citizens to redress their
grievances against government.
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